Time to hear the other side:
Transitional Temporalities and Transgenerational Narratives in post-genocide Rwanda

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Introduction

"We felt that it was time to shift the focus from the exclusive stories and listen to the other side." This statement was offered by a young survivor of the genocide against Rwandan Tutsi to my question about the rationale behind 'Youth Connekt Dialogue' (YCD or "the dialogues" in the text). YCD refers to a series of public events at district level where children of perpetrators (CPs), aged between 18 and 35 met with children [of] survivors to share their stories of living and growing up in post-genocide Rwanda as emerging and second generations. This contribution comes out of fieldwork research on the first phase of YCD (10 May – 30 June 2013) consisting of fifteen dialogues in the districts of Ngororero, Burera, Rubavu, Nyabihu, Gisagara, Nyamagabe, Nyaruguru, Kamonyi, Bugesera, Kicukiro, Gasabo, Nyarugenge, Kayonza, Gatsibo and Kirehe, as well as Iwawa Youth Rehabilitation centre. The event's slogan was 'Youth Connekt Dialogue: Promise of a post-genocide generation.'

To fully appreciate the significance of YCD, one must place it within the wider context of post-genocide transitional politics and narratives of national reconstruction. A theoretical and normative framework for understanding and evaluating Rwanda's post-genocide recovery has been an ongoing contentious issue among scholars of the transitional period (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). However, a reading of *Re-imagining Rwanda* (Pottier, 2002), *Remaking Rwanda* (Straus & Waldorf, 2011), *Rwanda under RPF* (JEAS, 8:2, 2014), *Courts in Conflicts* (Palmer, 2015) and *Making Ubumwe* (Purdékova, 2015) provides a comprehensive and balanced starting point.

More concretely, it is useful to analyse YCD in light of how state-sponsored public events are used to disseminate the post-genocide regime's narrative on national reconstruction (Thomson, 2011). Of further relevance is the role of children and young people in this narrative (Pells, 2011; Pells, Pontalti and Williams, 2014), with a particular emphasis on the agency of different generations of CPs (Mclean Hilker, 2014).

This contribution adds to this growing scholarship by attending to a third aspect of this analysis; looking particularly at how the timing of YCD fits within the social and political organisation of time in post-genocide politics. Working from the theoretical background of dominant, privileged and marginalised temporalisations in

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transitional societies (Valverde, 2014; Crawford, 2015), it approaches YCD as microcosm of Rwanda's transitional society where plural, competing and complementary temporalities interact constantly and fluidly.

Since the last decade of the 20th century, Rwanda evokes more than just geography or spatial reference. Rwanda has become a story with a timeline dominated by one moment of such magnitude that it has almost become the summary of the whole story. Most accounts of the genocide against Rwandan Tutsi in 1994 tend to start with a historical background or at least a timeline of the events. By linking time and causality, this approach implies that in time and political history, one might find the clues to a better understanding of one of the most brutal and tragic events of modern human history.

Time and the genocide against the Tutsi are intractably linked. No other genocide is locked in a perpetual embrace with a moment in time as the Rwandan catastrophe is with the year 1994. As much as the 'year 94' will be permanently marred by the events in Rwanda, the genocide against the Tutsi would seem conceptually diminished without its specific timestamp. Moreover, temporal references such as 'April 1994', 'April-July 1994' or a '100 days' have become customary narrative features in popular and academic accounts.

However, the importance of time as a factor came into sharper focus in the critical transitional period that followed the genocide. This period has been unquestionably dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the rebel movement that won the civil war of 1990-1994 and put an end to the genocide. The study interrogates the view held by sections of the scholarship on transitional Rwanda that RPF-led governments detain the monopoly of custody and mastery of time in their project of social engineering (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). In her remarkable research on post-genocide reconciliation, Thomson (2013) suggested that at the height of its social and political organisation of time, the state apparatus regimented the weekly lives of Rwandan citizen. Whilst making concession for the state's dominant temporalizing, I argue that the organisation of YCD was a critical juncture in the transitional timeline that showed how survivors and CPs bring their own senses of time to bear on transitional temporalisation.

The study also frames YCD as a restorative encounter *sui generis.* In doing so, it explores the timeliness of the emergence and invitation to dialogue of CPs as the politically responsible 'others' who are preferable to unrepentant or untrustworthy

Hutu *genocidaires*. CPSs' active introduction in the arena of transitional politics signalled more complex forms and experiences of temporality (Thompson, 1967). For instance, their shared status with children (of) survivors as "future oriented-people" (Améry, 1980) translated into intergenerational shared time sense expressed through the metaphors of 'rear-view mirror' versus 'windshield' temporalities. These metaphors will be developed later in the chapter when discussing the directional dichotomy characteristic of transgenerational temporalities in post-genocide Rwanda. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out that they imply dialectic and different trajectories in time-sense between participants in YCD and their adult relatives. Conversely, they broadly align with the government's future-looking temporalisation as expressed by 'Vision 2020' and its focus on children and youth as the 'Rwanda of tomorrow'.

It is argued that the study of YCD through the lenses of time provides a better understanding of how plural, competing and complementary temporalities interact in the transitional timeline, to reorder the past and shape the future. YCD envisioned this future as a 'tomorrow of peace without machetes'; a time when being Rwandese –*Ndi Umunyarwanda*– roots out ethnic identities and their history of misery. This time-focused approach makes it possible to view transitional processes as not happening in a temporal vacuum. Rather, time affects and informs processes and actors; it is a key factor and an invaluable resource in transitional policies. In the specific case of post-genocide Rwanda and YCD, this approach demonstrates better than most how generational narratives and political agencies evolve through and are shaped by time; leading to complex and plural forms of temporality in transitional reconstruction politics.

Some important terms and concepts used in this study need clarification.

CPSs or "Children of perpetrators" refers to the young Hutu of the emerging and second generations.

Second and emerging generations: In this contribution, 'emerging generation' refers to young Rwandans who were aged between nought (including children born during the genocide) and 12 years in April 1994. 'Second generation' comprises young Rwandans born after the official end of the Rwandan genocide

Children (of) survivors: refers to young Tutsi of the emerging and second generations who survived genocide as children or were born of Tutsi survivors. As much as semantic coherence allows it, the term "survivor" (active) is preferred to

"victim" (passive).

Genocide: Wherever possible, the events 1994 are given their legal name "genocide against the Tutsi." Whenever "genocide" is used alone; it effectively operates as a shortening of the full name rather than a denial of its specificity.

The content of this chapter is presented in three main sections. The first section documents how post-genocide priorities of security, justice and state building contributed to the rise of a form of dominant official temporality that is future-oriented in keeping with dramatic demographic changes. The second section analyses YCD as an instance and site of subaltern temporality; one that prefers a 'windshield' perception of transitional time to a problematic 'rear-view mirror' time-sense. The final section makes the case for understanding post-genocide Rwanda as a multi-layered transitional society where plural and competing temporalities shape the political landscape.

Transitional priorities and State dominant temporality

The new post-genocide government of national unity sworn in on 19 July 1994 inherited a ruined country and a shattered people. Faced with enormous internal challenges and mounting pressures from an international community slowly emerging from its dismayed slumber, the new government set about the task of rebuilding post-genocide Rwanda with commendable efficiency. This titanic undertaking has received intense and increasingly specialised scrutiny from the research community. There is currently a growing and critically informative literature on transitional policies ranging from territorial reorganisation to land legislation (Newbury, 2011; Ansoms, 2009; Chemouni, 2014; Ingelaere, 2011), from the prosecution of genocide through conventional institutions –ICTR and national ordinary courts- to the prevention of genocide ideology (Clark, 2010; Clark & Kaufman, 2009; Peskin, 2008; Palmer, 2015; Waldorf, 2006; 2011), from reconciliation and restorative justice (Thomson, 2011; 2014) to vast programmes of re-education on identity and citizenship (Purdékova, 2015).

The scale and methods of this post-genocide reconstruction undertaking has led some scholars to speak of a nationwide and ambitious project of social engineering; whether it is seen as a remaking (Straus and Waldorf, 2011) or a re-imagining (Pottier, 2002) of Rwanda. However, what has received negligible interest in this literature is the actual socio-political organisation of time by successive RPF-led governments as the dominant institution. In situations like post-genocide Rwanda

with the peculiarities and burdens of a dualist transitional society (Drumbl, 2000), time becomes a vital instrument of political power and significant power tends to rest with 'dominant groups who are able to impose their construction of time on others'(Crawford, 2015:7).

In this context, one can begin to understand the resolve of RPF-led governments to shape Rwanda's post-genocide transitional society and to impose themselves as the sole custodian of transitional temporality. At least three main reasons are behind this quest for temporal dominance: security, the prosecution of genocide and the need to build a strong post-genocide state. The latter explains another characteristic of governmental temporalizing, namely its overt focus on the future as documented in 'Vision 2020'. Dominant in nature and predominantly future-oriented in direction, the transitional governments have sought to impose this organisation of time not only nationally but vis-à-vis the international community as well.

Let us consider the prosecution of genocide as an example. Given the nature of this crime, it was inevitable that both national and international courts would claim priority of jurisdiction. On November 8, 1994, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 955 which created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based in Arusha. Palmer has noted that when Resolution 955 was adopted, Rwanda was the only but important dissenting vote (Palmer, 2015: 45). Therefore it came as no surprise when, in response to the UNSC Resolution, the Rwandan authorities passed Organic Law 8/96 which instituted 'Specialized Chambers' within national courts to prosecute genocide-related crimes.

Right from the start, the two judicial institutions disagreed on a very fundamental point, namely their jurisdiction *ratione temporis*. More concretely, the UN and the new Rwandan government diverged with respect to the period over which crimes considered as constituting genocide had been committed. The ICTR's mandate would only cover genocide-related crimes committed between January 1st and December 31st, 1994. However, Rwandan authorities argued that temporal jurisdiction should cover the period between 1 October 1990 (the start of the civil war) and 31 December 1994. This duality has remained unresolved throughout the delivery of transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda (Webster, 2011).

The significance of this disagreement over temporal jurisdiction should not be understated. It is further evidence of the determination of Rwandan authorities not to be at the mercy of external forces; especially an international community that

had stood by whilst the Tutsi were being systematically annihilated (Melvern, 2000; Dallaire, 2003). Furthermore, by asserting their jurisdiction over the temporality of genocide, Rwandan authorities sought to underline their status as 'victors'. They would not accept to be cast as losers or victims who would relinquish the control of post-genocide transition and narrative in the hands of some amorphous international community.

Thus, the BBC found this out at their expense when their "*Rwanda: the untold story*" documentary (2014) was met with withering criticism by the Rwandan government, culminating in the suspension of all BBC broadcasts on Rwandan territory. I have argued elsewhere (Benda, 2014) that the Rwandan authorities perceived the audacity of the BBC to put forth an alternative story as an infringement on the boundaries of 'narrative' competence. It was also a challenge to the authority of the Rwandan state and people in matters regarding their history. In other words, even if there were any truth in some aspects of the *untold story*, it is up to the stewards of the overall transitional narrative to determine the substance and the timeliness of its most salient components.

Vision 2020: Future-oriented temporality and transitional demographics

The three pillars of governmental temporalisation (security, justice and nation-building) have at times forced transitional governments into a tricky balancing act between past reality and future concerns. Crawford has asked the pertinent question of whether transitional justice can look simultaneously to the past and the future, whilst accommodating both justice and the demands for future security (2015:10). In post-genocide Rwanda, there have been palpable tensions between RPF-led governments' future-driven temporality and the survivors' need for confronting of Rwanda's recent past. This tension is reminiscent of Shearing's concept of "two moralities" that inform the governance of post-conflict security and justice. One morality functions from a past-focused logic that seeks to undo the damage done; not only by making material reparations but also by re-establishing the 'mystical balance' of a symbolic, societal order that has been violated. The second morality operates from a future-oriented logic that is less interested in futile attempts to reorder the past and insists instead preserving social cohesion by reducing the likelihood of future recurrence (Shearing, 2001:208-209).

Despite inevitable compromises –a punitive *Gacaca* among others, it is unquestionable that the thrust of official temporality has been explicitly –albeit not

exclusively- future-oriented. For the most part, the past has been deployed in the service of, and subsumed under the priorities of security and nation-building (Crawford, 2015:10-11). For their part, survivors have felt that a past-reordering "justice and what it required was independent of, and a precondition for, the governance of security" (Shearing, 2001:209).

It is important to note that Rwanda is not a unique case in this respect. In his wonderful essay on '*Resentment*', Amery offered a profound analysis of time and victimhood. He noted that contrary to the victims whose time-sense is fixated to the past, the rest of society tends to side 'with those to whom the future belongs.' Future, he goes on to say, is a value concept; "what will be tomorrow is more valuable than what was yesterday. That is how the natural feeling for time will have it."(Amery, 1980:76).

With this in mind, the transitional regime's *Vision 2020* is essential to understanding time organisation in post-genocide Rwanda. It should not be seen merely as an economic framework to transform Rwanda into a middle-income nation (Republic of Rwanda, 2012). Instead, it represents the clearest articulation of a highly institutionalised transitional temporality. It indicates the determination of the Rwandan state to lay down temporal landmarks by which it will assess and evaluate post-genocide reconstruction. According to the same official document, "Vision 2020 constitutes a bond that holds Rwandans as a people determined to build a better future [...] Rwandans will be a people sharing the same vision for the future and ready to contribute to social cohesion."(ibid: pp i.,9).

This focus on the future and the people who will own it leads inevitably to a brief examination of the impact of time on post-genocide demography. The most remarkable temporal effect of the transitional period has arguably been the dramatic transformation of the Rwandan population. Despite the sketchiness of census data immediately before and after genocide, it is now a matter of consensus that the last two decades have seen the Rwandan population more than double, standing at approximately 11 million in 2013 up from 5,57 million in 1995 (UN Secretariat, 2016). Democratic liberalism or lack thereof notwithstanding, it is clear that the different policies implemented by successive transitional governments, especially in the security and public health sectors, have played a key role in this demographic flourishing.

More than the increase in the population, it is the makeup of transitional

demography that interests this work. As of 2012, approximately 70% of the Rwandan population were young people of thirty years of age or under (Pells, Pontalti, &Williams, 2014). More importantly, at least 50% of this young population were born after the genocide of 1994 (Permanent Secretary MYICT, 2013). A cursory look at these figures would suggest that any successful policy must consider this population carefully, given their relevance for the present and the future of Rwanda.

Burman (2008) noted that periods of uncertainty and transition are marked by an increased tendency to symbolically position children in nation-building narratives. In her study of post-war Uganda, Cheney (2007) noted intriguing conceptual links between childhood and nationhood. She suggests that children's connection to the nation both strengthens their position as agents of social change and points to their subservience to adult ideals about both childhood and nationhood. In this context, children are cast in metaphors that romanticise them such as 'pillars of the nation', 'children as the future', while they still embody an idyllic past in the minds of adults (Cheney, 2008:10). Cheney's work has inspired scholars researching the situation and agency of children in Rwanda's post-genocide reconstruction narrative. In her research on the National Summit for Children, Pells sees Rwanda as a paradigmatic case 'where language and symbolism around children are central to a new narrative of national rebirth' (2011:78). It is at this intersection between transitional childhood (or youth) and nationhood remaking that YCD has to be located and analysed.

YCD: Transitional identities and Transgenerational temporalities

Organisers described the YCD's aim using the interesting directional metaphor of transitioning from a 'rear-view mirror' to a 'windshield' perspective (MM, Gatsibo, June 2013). They explained this metaphor as a shift from survivors-centred accounts to alternative stories (TE, Kicukiro, May 2013). In no way does this shift imply narrative replacement or supplanting. Instead it brings into focus and invites worthy interlocutors from the privacy of their feelings into the public arena of transitional politics. YCD constituted one of those key moments in transitional periods when one group acknowledges the other as essential for the (hi)story of the conflict that led to that moment to unfold fully. Therefore, the dialogues offered themselves to interpretation first as a restorative encounter of a particular kind.

Timeline and timeliness of a (trans)generational restorative encounter

The concrete emerging and timeliness of the 'moment of dialogue' (Collins, 2004) resulted from a process that has a timeline of its own. As one might expect, the starting point was April 1994 when BE, a hospitalised 9 year old Hutu boy witnessed the brutal murder of fellow patients because they were Tutsi. After his release from hospital, he was dismayed to find that most of his Tutsi teachers and schoolmates had been killed. Faced with a wall of silence from Hutu adults in his attempt to understand this still localised tragedy, BE used poetry, music and acting to deal with his sense of loss and grief.

Between 2004 and 2006, his artistic work came to the attention of governmental figures and survivors association because of its content –sympathy for Tutsi victims and overt indictment of Hutu adults for genocide. Often invited by survivors to recite poetry as part of their mourning and commemoration gatherings, he was also given the opportunity to share his own traumatic experience of witnessing genocide as a child and growing up with the guilt and shame of a 'child of killers'. As a bond of mutual understanding developed between him and survivors, BE felt that adult Hutu perpetrators should follow his example. Unfortunately, he found that "for them genocide was like a football game that had come to an end ...life should continue and people should move on." (BBC, 2013). However, some CPs as well as young Tutsi survivors, especially fellow artists, responded positively to his message.

> We came to the conclusion that we should come together to form the pact of a generation, a pact for life. This is how 'Art for Peace' was born; to create for ourselves a future of peace without the machetes (BE, Kicukiro, May 2013).

During the 'Youth Week' in early 2013, Art for Peace invited the First Lady and shared their vision with her. She offered to support their effort to reach out to young people in every district of Rwanda in collaboration with the Ministry of Youth and ICT (MYICT). Thus was born the YCD initiative (Bamporiki, 2010:12-16).

From this brief outline of its inception and timeline, YCD appears as an atypical restorative encounter. A typical restorative encounter brings together the offender and the offended in a justice-oriented moral space for confronting the past in order to govern the future (Shearing, 2001). YCD was atypical because it was in actual fact an encounter between two groups who were victims of the *genocidaires'*

crimes, although they have been affected differently.

Whilst the victimhood of Tutsi is somewhat easy enough to establish, that of the CPs is more complex and requires careful examination of the psychology of transgenerational transmission of guilt, blame and liability in the particular context of post-genocide Rwanda. Stories told during the dialogues revealed that some CPs are victims of the traumatic witnessing of their adult relatives committing incomprehensible atrocities. Those who were too young or unborn to be witnesses suffer from the silence of their adult relatives as they try to understand the social stigma attached to their lives. In post-genocide Rwanda, the terms 'children of Hutu', 'children of perpetrators' or 'children of killers' are routinely used interchangeably (YCD-Kicukiro, 2013). In a culture where genealogical affiliation and generational ties play a crucial role in social interactions, there is a natural tendency for Tutsi survivors to assimilate children to their progenitors through a blanket transfer of transgenerational or collective blame.

In this context, YCD has to be seen as a timely restorative justice encounter in which these two groups sought to attend to justice in at least two ways. First, both groups were seeking to do justice to each other through shared stories of victimhood. Secondly, there was a clear intention to address the 'transgenerational injustice' suffered by CPs by making it clear that the criminal liability of parents and adult relatives does not extend to their descendants or younger relatives. In the future-oriented context of post-genocide transitional politics, YCD was primarily a platform for the restoration of CPs to their rightful place as blameless Rwandan citizens. On the other hand, it made it possible for survivors of genocide to enter into a civic partnership of national reconstruction without having to compromise with what is impossible to reconcile with, at least for the time being.

From Rear-view mirror to Windshield: trajectory of transgenerational temporalities

The founders of Art for Peace had a vision for their generation: a future of peace without machetes. The twisted irony of the poetics of this vision will not be lost to speakers of the Kinyarwanda language: *amahoro* (peace) rhymes with *imihoro* (machetes –singular form *umuhoro*), by far the tool of choice in the technology of genocide against the Tutsi. This is not just a vision of the future; it is first and foremost a clear indictment of the past. Transitional temporalities from the perspective of emerging and second generations operate from this stark dichotomy that functions like a truncated caesura: *past is imihoro//future is amahoro*. From

this perspective, it makes perfect sense for organisers and participants to locate their political agency in the sort of temporality that wants to turn away from past-saturated narratives (rear-view mirror) to focus on new stories of change (windshield). As one of the young organisers rhetorically pointed out, "if you drive with your eyes glued on the rear-view mirror; how will you avoid accidents and collisions?" (MM, Gatsibo, 2013)

Rear-view mirror: problematizing past-focused temporalities

The implications of this rhetorical question lead to the examination of what is perceived as problematic with past-oriented transitional temporalities. After all, the history of Rwanda is replete with 'accidents' and 'collisions' that resulted from ill-thought politicisation of the past. YCD's stated desire to 'move on' from a *past of imihoro* should first be seen as externalizing a more traumatised relationship with this "machetes season" (Hatzfeld, 2006). For many participants in the dialogues, *imihoro* still conjure up moments of chilling horror and personal tragedy (Rieder & Elbert, 2013). For young Tutsi participants like KE (Gatsibo, May 2013), physical scars spoke for themselves. For young Hutu like BE, it is the vivid memory of a machete-severed head coming to rest at the foot of his hospital bed. Overall, the reoccurrence of *ihahamuka* (Taylor, 2015) episodes during YCD meetings showed that young Rwandans are still gripped by the psychological effects of this past.

Several studies have highlighted the lasting effects of genocide and war (Rakita, 2003; Reider & Elbert, 2013) as well as the prevalence of PTSD and other psychological disorders among Rwandan young people (Sydor & Philippot, 1996; Dyregrov et al., 2000; Munyandamutsa et al, 2012; Neugbauer et al., 2009; Schaal et al., 2011). As early as 1995, UNICEF reported that "almost all Rwandan children have either been victims or witnesses of massacres or they have lost a family member during the 1994 events" (Sydor & Philippot, 1996:235). Sydor and Philippot's research concluded that among other things a "humanitarian catastrophe can generate psychological reaction even among people who were only witnesses or onlookers" (1996:242). With this scientific evidence in mind, turning away from 'rear-view mirrors' can be interpreted as an intentional and resilient act of reclaiming one's sanity, health and life, no less. It is daring to imagine lives that are not utterly dominated by the tragedy of 1994.

This desire to reclaim one's life raises fascinating transgenerational paradoxes in both groups. Starting with young Tutsi participants, it was obvious that the majority

had been alive at the time of genocide; thus they are as much survivors as their parents or adult relatives. One of the reasons put forward by the organisers of YCD was that post-genocide transitional narratives and rehabilitative policies had been overwhelmingly survivors-centred. In a country of perennially limited resources, being at the centre of political action meant access to at least some of these meagre resources. It also meant keeping the genocide against the Tutsi firmly anchored at the centre of public life. Social bodies and institutions such as the Fond d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG), the Week of National Mourning/*Icyunamo*, Memorial sites/*Urwibutso* and the different laws against genocide and genocide ideology embodied this survivors-centred transitional temporality.

Why then would young Tutsi survivors and children of survivors contemplate an alternative temporalization? One might recall Crawford's suggestion that young people's shorter time horizons imply different temporalities (2014:20). This would imply that young Tutsi have the ability to 'move on' quicker than older generation survivors. Although this might be true, there was little evidence of this assertion during YCD. Instead, one might suggest that these contrasting temporalities hint at a gradual and rather pragmatic re-evaluation of the socio-political dividends of Shearing's "two moralities" alluded to previously; the benefits of reordering the past on one hand and planning for a cohesive future on the other.

There was a perceptible feeling among YCD Tutsi organisers that past-focused and exclusively survivors-centred temporalizing might lead to increased or generalised resentment within the population. Améry (1980) has expertly written about transitional resentment, especially from the perspective of frustrated victims. Resentment, Améry suggested, is past-obsessed. It leads to a twisted and dis-ordered time-sense. It blocks the exits to genuine human dimension, namely the future (ibid: p.69). Therefore, it is unappealing to young people who are future-oriented, "those to whom the future belongs" (p.76). YCD's repudiation of 'rear-view mirror' temporality implied that the cyclical return to the past might have more value for the older generations of both ethnic groups. Young people should cast in their lot with fellow future-oriented people.

The thought of reclaiming lives from resentment-inducing temporalities was more urgent among CPs. For this group, transgenerational transmission of guilt –moral, societal and even legal- was voiced as a recurrent daily life experience. As one participant put it,

> Being a Hutu child is being a child of killers. You know it and you know that the survivors cannot help but see you in that way, even if they never say it to your face. Who could blame them? For us it is a problem. It is bitterly frustrating but it is what it is (UC, Kicukiro, May 2013).

Therefore, by focusing on crimes committed against Tutsi in 1994, 'rear-view mirror' temporalities also focus on their parents' and adult relatives' crimes, and by relational-genealogical association, to CPs. The move to legally ban ethnic divisionism (Law No 47/2001 of December 2001) has done little in reality to minimise transmissibility and collectivisation of guilt across Hutu generations (Rubavu, May 2013). From a *bona fide* wronged party, these young people have become putative perpetrators. This, YCD organisers feared, is the disfiguring effect of rear-view mirror temporalisation in post-genocide Rwanda; a distortion that cuts through the phenomenology of identity for the majority of CPs who attended YCD. They stated that being 'lumped together' with Hutu killers and criminals led to their being held back socially and economically (Gisagara & Kamonyi, May 2013). As an example of this obstruction CPs mentioned access to education, which is only free at primary school and rather expensive at secondary and tertiary levels. Whilst young Tutsi survivors can get support from FARG, their Hutu counterparts have no equivalent, even for those who have both parents in prison (Gasabo, May 2013).)

In the course of YCD, it became increasingly clear that for the most part CPs' frustration and resentment were directed primarily toward adult Hutu. Bamporiki's *Their sin, our shame* (2010) captures these feelings succinctly. In the course of the dialogues, CPs spoke of years spent trying to extract the truth from their imprisoned parents without success. One young man was so exasperated by his incarcerate father's denial that he used his last visit to sever his relationship with someone he called a 'disappointing coward' (Kamonyi, May 2013). Finally, there were the painful stories from the most authentic children of killers, namely those born from the raping of Tutsi women by killers. One of them described their condition in the matter-of-fact tone of people for whom emotional pain has become a life companion:

> I do not know who my father was but I know what he was. He was one of many killers who raped my mother. Try growing up with that! My mother has wished me dead from the first day. No family wants anything to do with me and the government does not recognise me as a survivor's child.

> We are children of sorrow, born to afflict everyone (NJ, Gisagara, May 2013).

However, frustration and quiet resentment did not go only in one direction. Cross-generational research shows that this is rarely the case (Berger & Berger, 2001, Dan Bar-On, 1991). Some CPs were concerned that the 'annual rewinding of time back to April 1994' led to cyclically renewed resentment and brooding animosity between Rwandans. They generally understood that institutions such as *icyunamo* and *Urwibutso* fulfilled the dual role of remembering-*kwibuka (*victims and for victims) and reminding-*Kwibutsa* (perpetrators and for perpetrators). However, they felt that survivors -and the government- used the latter as a means of keeping all Hutu on the defensive politically. This, they felt, was counterproductive in the long-term; especially when no transgenerational differentiation is made between perpetrators and their children.

Windshield perspective: committing to a future of peace and responsible citizenship

The problematic relationship between emerging and second generations, and past-focused temporalities went a long way to generate the kind of 'time-feel' expressed by organisers of YCD; "we felt that it was time to hear the other side's story." Time feeling in post-genocide Rwanda requires not only good social intuition but also skilful reading of the transitional political landscape. In the case of YCD, it required timing in order to gauge the receptiveness and readiness of the survivors. It also involved generational prioritisation; to hear the perpetrators' side without necessary listening to the perpetrators themselves. Windshield temporalisation thus implied direction and demographics. As Améry would have it, it grants the 'advance in trust' due to future-oriented persons who do not lay claim to innocence vigorously and impudently, but are instead prepared to bear responsibility for the April-July 1994 catastrophe (1980:76).

Political responsibility was central to the windshield-facing transition advocated by YCD. It was essential in order to move on from reaction, guilt and endless introspection toward constructive action and change. It was not a vacuous ideal either. The dialogues revealed fascinating stories of CPs taking responsibility for their adult relatives' actions. There was the story of UJ, a young Hutu woman whose brother had been sentenced in absentia, who decided to take his place in TIG (work of general interest) for two years (Kirehe, June 2013). There were also the stories of CPs who set up clubs to help survivors who have lost all their

children (Gisagara, May 2013, Kirehe, June 2013). There were people like BE who held deep-seated empathy for survivors' experiences and stories. Arguably the sort of intragenerational networking that led to the creation of Art for Peace and the organisation of YCD is an instance of political responsibility in action.

Therefore, the organisation of YCD marked a point in transitional temporalizing when the time felt right to move these instances of political responsibility from the private to the public realm. It was not only a moment for the externalisation and actualization of a lingering conflict between Tutsi survivors and Hutu perpetrators in order to master an opposite yet shared past (Améry, 1980). Rather, YCD constituted a moment of concretisation for the 'others' and their stories, as well as a starting point for their incorporation in the overall narrative of post-genocide reconstruction as envisioned within the government's Vision 2020. This last point, coupled with what has been said earlier about governmental future-oriented temporalisation, explains why the government was keen to sponsor and incorporate a bottom-up initiative; particularly one that finds its inception within perpetrators' quarters.

Windshield-view, future-looking and change-driven, this is the new stage in transitional temporality heralded by YCD. Change, it has been elucidated, will be brought about through responsibility to own the past and build the future. Concepts such as 'children of killers', 'children of perpetrators' along with the already outlawed 'children of Hutu' will give place to "builders of a nation". YCD served up memorable songs but none was captivating as Masamba's *Jenga, jenga taifa lako. Build, build your nation* or Gatsibo youth's *Rwanda itajengwa na sisi vijana. Rwanda will be built by us the youth.* It is important to emphasize that these 'future builders' – note the passive form and future tense of the Kiswahili verb "kujenga"- are not just building a country. This is where borrowing from Kiswahili is useful; there is a significant narrative difference between *taifa* (nation) and *nchi* (country). Thus, the next stage in the rebuilding of post-genocide Rwanda will only be possible through the intergenerational solidarity of those to whom its future belongs.

Building a new nation in which the responsible other is not only heard but also fully included in national reconstruction requires a new framework which will determine how time is organised in the next stage of transition. YCD provided such a framework in the form of *Ndi Umunyarwanda*, literally 'I am Rwandese'. *Ndi Umunyarwanda* arose from and is seen as a seamless continuation of YCD

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(President Kagame, 2013). It was launched officially on July 2013 and on 23 October 2013, the Council of Ministers decreed that *Ndi Umunyarwanda* would be discussed in all public institutions, civil society, NGOs and religious associations. Similarly, Rwandan Ambassadors and High Commissioners have the mandate to promote this programme among various Rwandan communities of the diaspora. (Umuseke, October 2013). As recently as January 2017, a prominent member of the Rwandan Parliament referred to *Ndi Umunyarwanda* as the "story, vision, philosophy and programme for a new nation." (MP Gatabazi, London, 2017). Through the windshield view, *Ndi Umunyarwanda* promises clearer visibility for the road ahead.

YCD's Narratives and Plural Temporalities in post-genocide Rwanda

In his typology of post-genocidal societies, Drumbl makes a robust case for the classification of Rwanda as a dualist post-genocidal society (2000:1237-1252). However, closer scrutiny reveals post-genocide Rwanda as a rather plural transitional society in which multiple stakeholders vie to assert their narrative and temporality; in other words their political agency. YCD was a microcosm of this transitional society and the various temporalities that have been at the heart of transitional politics in post-genocide Rwanda. "We felt that it was the right time to hear the stories from the other side". These words encapsulated these concomitantly competing and complementary temporalities.

It has been shown that the Rwandan state, through various RPF-led governments, and genocide survivors fall into the category of the keepers or custodians of transitional time, although the former exerts more dominance than the latter. The perpetrators and their descendants constitute the 'other side', cast as those who contribute to post-genocide temporalisation from a position of marginality, subversion, expectation or outright passivity.

As suggested earlier, three main reasons have contributed to the state's dominant temporalization: security, the prosecution of genocide and the need to build a strong post-genocide state. This has led to a complex type of institutional temporality that sought to hold past, present and future in precarious balance. Valverde (2014) has made a case for the crucial role of temporality in all security projects. This is particularly relevant in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda where internal and external factors had combined to create a situation of clear, immediate and explosive danger. However, whilst security was undoubtedly a

priority so was making sure that all *genocidaires* were immediately neutralised, apprehended, incarcerated and tried lawfully.

Equally requiring justice were the returning Tutsi exiled following the 1959-1964 and 1973 pogroms; the same people who had supported the RPF's war effort and therefore entitled to housing and land. This situation imposed urgent demands on public and civil justice and necessitated delicate temporalisation focused on recent and remote political history. To compound the transitional equation, prosecuting genocide and resettling Tutsi returnees confronted the government with the real possibility of doing a great deal of injustice to -and thus alienating- many innocent Hutu. Since the latter would be an essential and integral part for a united post-genocide state, transitional temporalisation had to be future-minded as well. At different stages of transitional politics, priorities have dictated appropriate temporalities.

Therefore, the decidedly future-oriented temporality displayed by the government through the sponsoring of YCD was in no way indicative of one-dimensional temporalizing. Instead, it represented a timely response to a transitional priority and demonstrated the kind of flexible temporalization that has been characteristic of the Rwandan transitional regime.

YCD also demonstrated that despite its dominant role, the state is by no means the only player in the field of transitional temporality. Since the RPF regime is credited with stopping the genocide against the Tutsi and because it has been labelled 'Tutsi' in many quarters, it has become almost natural to think that their time-sense would align with that of Tutsi survivors. It has also become increasingly acceptable in some academic circles to portray the post-genocide RPF-led regime as strongly authoritarian, even totalitarian (Reyntjens, 2004 ; Purdékova, 2011, 2015; Longman, 2011). It therefore has the ability to impose its own agenda over the transitional period unchecked; including in all genocide-related matters.

However, YCD showed that survivors play a key role in the decisions regarding the timeliness of policy and other public initiatives on genocide and its legacy. As the prime victims of the tragedy, their recovery and readiness to move on to whatever next stage is required by justice, reconciliation and reconstruction programmes is essential. The organisation of YCD showed that survivors had a strong say about inviting and welcoming the other side's stories. In fact, one can go as far as suggesting that there has been a semi-concerted effort between government and

survivors to avoid a transitional situation where, in Améry's words, the public consciousness loses the memory of genocide and the disquiet disappears among perpetrators (1980:71).

By insisting that genocide be prosecuted for as long as it takes for every perpetrator to be brought to justice, survivors refused to be subjugated to natural, biological or social time-sense (Améry, 1980). In this kind of transitional temporality, victims are forced by social pressure to forgive and forget as soon as the crime is considered as being long past (1980:71-72). Instead, throughout the transitional period, they fostered a kind of 'constructive resentment' among the survivors aimed at arousing 'self-mistrust' in the camp of perpetrators with the expectation that spurred by the former's resentment, Hutu perpetrators "would remain sensitive to the fact that they cannot allow a piece of their (...) history to be neutralized by history but integrate it" (pp.77-78). This, Améry argues, is the appropriate transitional time-sense; one that is moral in essence and redeeming in political intentionality (p.79).

Framing post-genocide temporality in moral terms might explain the timing of YCD and why CPs were the more 'acceptable' choice. A question of constant concern for Tutsi survivors is whether a *génocidaire* can be truly reformed and trusted again, at least politically. Stories of genocidaires who confessed and publicly apologised for their crimes are not uncommon, especially after the Gacaca trials (Clark, 2012). Quite beside the near impossibility of ascertaining their authenticity, confessions and apologies can only be considered as the first steps on a long journey to moral and civic rehabilitation. Therein lies the question of time and restorative politics. How long would such a process take? Is it fair on survivors to be expected to go the proverbial extra mile and wait for this conversion – essentially contingent- to materialise?

It is important however to emphasise that the form of non-institutional temporality espoused by adult Tutsi survivors is far from monolithic and goes beyond the moral sphere. These survivors are far from 'uncle Yans' and 'aunty Tans' suspended in a specific time (see Hinton's contribution in this volume); the time of genocide. Reducing survivors to a one-dimensional time-sense would in fact be undercutting their very identity and experience. Surviving understood as 'living beyond' requires resilience and adaptability that makes life in the aftermath not only possible but also worthwhile. For survivors of the Rwandan genocide this meant seeking justice but also loving, having families and raising children, working and setting up

businesses; in other words, celebrating life in the present whilst securing a future for themselves and their descendants. The latter is not different from the post-genocide state's determination to build a Rwanda fit for children (Pells, 2011). This meaningful living in the aftermath also meant adopting a flexible relation to transitional time as well as engaging in a complex of interactions with the temporalities of other transitional agencies.

Therefore, the past-focused pursuit for justice does not preclude survivors from Shearing's future-looking logic or eject them from Améry's genuine human dimension, the future. For instance, the existence of *reconciliation villages* in which survivors willingly live alongside perpetrators (Mugabo, 2015; Ong, 2017; Baddorf, 2010), as improbable as their future may be, proves that survivors are willing to extend trust credit. Those for whom the weight of history and experience of betrayal have made wary of hasty conciliatory discourses have not let these reservations encompass the CPs as well. By supporting YCD and subsequently *Ndi Umyarwanda*, survivors have opted for descendant-focused transgenerational restoration, instead of maintaining the ascendant-inherited transmission of blame. In this respect, they come to the future-oriented, windshield-like temporality championed by government-sponsored YCD but on their terms and following an autonomous process.

Speaking of these 'descendants', YCD showed signs that CPs' are far from passive beneficiaries of a gratuitous political credit. If anything, their stories revealed an equally complex time-conscience, one that is finely attuned to the fluidity of transitional politics. For instance, the lobbying for and organisation of the dialogues served as indication that this generation is increasingly aware of their political relevance. It was the right time for them to alert the transitional *agora* to their alternative identities and life stories, which are distinct from those of their progenitors.

Furthermore, although their understanding – and for the most part support for – transitional survivor-sensitive temporalisation was reaffirmed in the course of the dialogues, it was not uncritical. For instance, they questioned the selective nature of the 'past'; the officially edited version of history that informed governmental temporalities. Central to their criticism is the question of "how far back in time should we go to establish causality and responsibility for genocide?" In Nyabihu and Burera districts (May 2013), young people made a case of historical

responsibility against Rwandan Tutsi monarchs for their collusion with (German and Belgian) colonizers. In this case, they inquired, does it stand to reason to blame colonial authorities only and exculpate Tutsi kingship?

By raising these historical questions, young people aimed their criticism against a perceived revisionism of history that seems to sanitize political history from the rise of the Nyiginya dynasty to the troubled period of 1959-1964. This process effectively exonerates all Tutsi regimes and the lays historical blame on the Hutu leadership of the post-independence years (1962-1994). CPs voiced concerns regarding this dichotomic segmentation of Rwanda's political timeline and called for a more 'balanced history' to be taught in schools and public sessions (Gisagara & Rubavu districts, May 2013).

CPs' stories also indicated that past-focused and victimhood-centred temporalities of the transitional period had greatly segregated victims. Only Tutsi had been considered victims, leaving out other categories of victims such as children from mixed marriages, Hutu widows and widowers, and Hutu victims of the killings in April-July 1994. Equally overlooked were Hutu killed or widowed by RPF soldiers during the civil war (1990-1994), during the Insurgents' War –*intambara y'abacengezi*- in the North West of Rwanda (1996-1997), and in the course of the dismantling of refugee camps both inside Rwanda and in the former Zaire. Some young people, especially from the northern districts of Burera, Rubavu and Nyabihu, went as far as subverting the timeline of genocide itself by openly and candidly saying that genocide in fact happened in 1996-1997 (Art for Peace, 2013). This point brought the issues of victimhood temporality back at the centre of public debate. More particularly, it raised the question of when crimes committed by the current regime will be addressed and what would be the modalities.

A final example that showed the desire of CPs to stake their claim in transitional narratives and temporalisation was the liberal use of the officially banned ethnic terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi'. Lively discussions of ethnicity showed that the topic is far from settled as implied by laws and policies against divisionism and genocide ideology. Participants pointed to the obvious idiosyncratic and anachronistic nature of suppressing ethnicity whilst maintaining it within the nomenclature of genocide. Both in Burera and Nyabihu districts (May 2013), it was argued that to thoroughly follow the logic of ethnic suppression, the genocide against Tutsi should be known as "the genocide against people who *were* Tutsi by people who *were* Hutu (my emphasis)." In other words, genocide cannot remain in the present whilst the

protagonists are relegated in the past. YCD participants felt that a more community-based and frank dialogue on the topic is preferable to peremptory institutional suppression.

Consequently, a shared national identity would emerge gradually through a process of careful identification of core Rwandan values lost or diluted by colonialism, as well as the responsible owning up to the more recent history of ethnic violence. Thus *Ndi umunyarwanda* developed out of these dialogues as the quest and framework for the future ethnic-free *umunyarwanda* as envisioned by those to whom that future belongs, both biologically and politically.

Conclusion

When young Rwandans of the emerging and second generations came together in May-June 2013 for intragenerational dialogues, theirs was a desire to make a pact for life with the seemingly straightforward terms of leaving a past of *imihoro* behind and embrace a future of *amahoro.* Yet, a time-aware approach to these dialogues reveals unsuspected ambiguity and complexity. From this perspective, YCD offered a narrative rebuttal to normative transitional binaries survivor-perpetrator and past-future. Thus, by introducing ambiguous identities, complex narratives and fluid temporalities, YCD find their home in what Hinton's contribution to this volume calls the "gray zones" of the transitional period.

Paying attention to the significance of time in transitional processes such as YCD in post-genocide Rwanda makes it possible to prove that there rarely is a single master or custodian of the transitional time. Instead this period is shown to be the site of plural, contested, competing and complementary temporalities as the Rwandan state, genocide survivors and young adults of the emerging and second generations vie to assert their political agency. Alongside the diversity of transitional agencies, directionality equally contributes to plural temporalities. No one transitional stakeholder in post-genocide Rwanda is confined to a specific time. Instead they all entertain a vari-directional and flexible relationship with transitional time; moving fluidly between future-oriented and past-focused forms of temporality in response to transitional priorities or necessities.

YCD demonstrated that it is in this context of plurality and flexibility that a new national identity is being negotiated in the guise of *Ndi Umunyarwanda* . However, despite the promises of *Vision 2020,* transitional Rwanda is still dominated by the genocide of 1994 as that past which, as Fellows would have it, "is always

contemporaneous, as part of …perception of the present. In this scenario, temporality is the abrasive instrument continuously changing and layering the original narrative" (Fellows, 2009:1049).

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Key terms

-Children of perpetrators

-Emerging and second generations

-Genocide against Tutsi

-Ndi umunyarwanda

-Post-genocide reconstruction

-Rwanda

-Temporality

    Institutional

    Non-institutional

    dominant

    Plural temporalities

    Windshield temporalities

    Rear-view mirror temporalities

-Time-sense

-Transgenerational

    Narratives

    temporalities

-Transitional

    politics

    policy

    identities

-Youth Connect Dialogues

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